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The nationalisation of post-communist party systems 
 
 
Party nationalisation, defined as the homogeneity of party strength across a 
country, has recently become a major issue in research. Even though territory is a 
salient political question in the post-communist countries in Europe, party nationa-
lisation in these countries has been neglected by the literature so far. This article 
presents data on party nationalisation for twenty countries over the period 1990-
2007. It shows that the nationalisation of party systems in post-communist 
democracies is closely related to the territorial structure of social divides, except 
for cases where the electoral systems provide for a high degree of nationalisation, 
or where super-presidentialism inhibits the creation of strong nationalised parties. 
 
Keywords: Electoral geography; party nationalisation; Central and Eastern Europe; 
post-communist politics; ethnic minorities. 
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Introduction: Why study party nationalisation? 
Territorial factors have been neglected by most of the literature on party systems for years, as 
many scholars have taken for granted that political parties usually have nationalised 
structures, meaning that they exist and compete countrywide. Regional political arenas and 
the role of non-countrywide political parties and regional party systems (low party 
nationalisation) have become intensively debated recently.2 Studies on party nationalisation 
question whether political parties and party systems are homogeneous in a whole country, or 
if there are substantial spatial differences in political preferences, electoral competition, and 
the electoral strength of political parties (Jones & Mainwaring, 2003; Caramani, 2004; 
Ishiyama, 2002).3 With their strong territorial divides, highly regionalised party systems, and 
multi-ethnic make-ups, the former communist democracies in Europe such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, or Ukraine, appear to be a particularly relevant set of cases for this 
research field. 
This study extends the party nationalisation research to post-communist democracies. It not 
only provides the first measures of party nationalisation for twenty countries and 95 elections 
in Central and Eastern Europe, but it also offers new explanations to why in certain countries 
the main political conflicts are territorially based while other places lack any territorial 
dimension. 
Nationalisation of political parties plays is relevant both for politics in practice, and for many 
concepts in political science.The most dramatic cases, where territorial divides became 
infamous, are linked to wars (e.g. the “American Civil War”, Bosnia), or to geopolitical 
                                           
 2  Previously, researchers treated party systems rather as a national unit, not focussing on the regional 
heterogeneity, and only few studies (for instance Rose & Urwin, 1975) addressed the subject. 
 3 Related terminologies focus, more or less explicitly, on the heterogeneity across electoral districts, speaking 
of party aggregation (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Allik, 2006), district heterogeneity (Morgenstern & Potthoff, 
2005), or cross-district linkage/party-linkage across districts (Cox, 1999; Hicken, 2005; Moenius & Kasuya, 
2004). 
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struggles (e.g. Ukraine). However, in countries with strong territorial divides, regional or 
local political autonomy can allow a close reflection of the political will of regional 
constituencies by the regional or local governments. Non-territorial divides cannot be 
ameliorated through decentralisation, but on the other hand, they can also not become 
catalysts for separatist movements. Party nationalisation is also closely related to the effect of 
electoral systems. Territorially based electoral districts are the key element of the mechanism 
of many electoral rules, so that the territorial structure of political parties makes a crucial 
difference for the effect of electoral systems. Finally, spatial variance in the voters' 
preferences can be reflected in regionally differentiated policies. 
This study tests the two main concepts that have dominated the discussion on party natio-
nalisation so far, focusing on twenty countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It innovates by 
showing the relationship between territorially based ethnic divides, which are measured with 
a new indicator, and the nationalisation of party systems through a systematic quantitative 
analysis. The study focuses on the aggregated measure of party system nationalisation as 
dependent variable, with countries as units of analysis. Most variables that are considered to 
affect the nationalisation have an effect on the whole party system, and not only on single 
parties. This is why aggregated measures of the nationalisation of party systems are fairly 
representative for the nationalisation of single parties too, especially in party systems that are 
divided along ethnic lines. 
Showing the connection between ethnic divides and the nationalisation of party systems leads 
to a profoundly different conclusion from the ones of the previous research on the 
phenomenon. The institutional explanation, looking at the role of the centralisation of govern-
ments (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004), appears not to hold for the post-communist democracies. 
Instead, I base my explanation on the role of social divides and political cleavages (Caramani, 
2004) and on the impact of national electoral thresholds. These models offer a very accurate 
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explanation of the varying levels of the nationalisation of party systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The findings might also help to anticipate the territorial structure of party 
systems, and contribute to a better prediction of institutional effects, which greatly aids 
institutional engineering. 
The focus on Central and Eastern Europe offers a sample of easily comparable cases with 
similar contextual factors, such as the legacy of their communist past and their recent 
political transition. On the other hand, the different political, social, and economic histories, 
compared to their Western counterparts, might explain why I come to different results than 
earlier studies. The high variance in the nationalisaton of party systems across post-
communist countries is suited for a comparative analysis.4 
The first part of this article reviews the relevant literature and presents the explanatory 
approaches that will be employed. This is followed by a description of the development of 
party nationalisation in 95 elections, and a multivariate analysis of the effect of 
decentralisation, territorial ethnic divides, and electoral systems on party nationalisation. 
Four explanations of party nationalisation 
Political parties win their seats within electoral districts, so that from a pure electoral system 
perspective, a party does not need to be organised across districts in order to win seats in 
parliament. Nevertheless, even in countries with many electoral districts, parties join in a 
national structure. This section discusses several aspects that explain the formation of 
national party systems, and that might help to explain cross-country variance in party 
nationalisation. 
                                           
 4  Party nationalisation has been studied earlier for a sample of eleven countries in the region. One of the major 
findings is that district size is closely related to party nationalisation (Tiemann, 2005). However, the findings 
of this study seem to be little robust, because of a potential bias in the measure of party nationalisation, 
which shows much higher values when there are many territorial units, such as electoral districts, than when 
we employ only a few territorial units. Accordingly, artefacts emerging from this operationalisation, relying on 
the number of districts, can hardly be distinguished from real impacts of district size. 
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Centralised state, centralised parties – or the other way round? 
The prevalent school describes party nationalisation as a consequence of the centralisation of 
power. Most important institutional explanations rely on the dominance of national 
executives over parliaments (Cox, 1997, pp. 186-193), on presidentialism (Hicken, 2003; 
Kasuya, 2001; Samuels, 2002; Cox, 1997, pp. 187-190), and on unitary and centralised states 
(Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Harbers, 2009). 
One of the two mentioned institutional dimensions are legislative-executive relations. The 
arguments that are used in the literature are diametrically opposed to each other. Certain 
authors focus on strong presidential offices, arguing that presidential electoral campaigns 
might help for the formation of national political parties, in linking the party system to 
nationally competing presidential candidates (Hicken, 2003, p. 4; Samuels, 2002). 
Presidential candidates rely on party sections as local resources for their elections, while 
legislative candidates profit from linkages to the presidential campaign (Samuels, 2002, p. 
468; Kasuya, 2001, pp. 15-18). In turn, powerful presidential offices deprive political parties 
of the function of government formation, notably if the president is not elected as a partisan 
candidate. Hence, nationalisation through presidential campaigns should only be expected if 
presidential candidates are closely linked to political parties, and if elections for the executive 
and the legislature are held simultaneously (Hicken, 2003; Kasuya, 2001; Clark & Wittrock, 
2005). 
In the super-presidential systems of Central and Eastern Europe, this is not the case. A 
different literature has, however, supposed a different link of party nationalisation to the 
executive-legislative relations. It highlights the function of parliamentary elections to 
indirectly elect the prime minister, and if this view prevails, strong parliamentary executives 
might be responsible for high party nationalisation (Hicken, 2003; Cox, 1997). In countries 
where the parliament elects the government, voters and political actors attribute much more 
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responsibility for national policies to the parliament than in presidential regimes (Tucker, 
2002, p. 58). This, in turn, increases the importance of national political parties, while in 
(certain) presidential systems, there might be no incentives for parties to organise nationally. 
“The fully separate selection process of the executive and assembly and the lack of mutual 
dependence once in office permits voters and campaign contributors to demand different 
things of their executive and legislative candidates. As a result, voters need not demand that 
their legislators show loyalty to a party label” (Shugart & Haggard, 2001, p. 84). 
Certainly, under PR, there are other institutional incentives for political parties to nationalise 
– the electoral competition is structured around party lists, and often there are national 
compensation mechanisms inhibit parties to compete countrywide. In single-seat district 
electoral systems, similar incentives are lacking: candidates are elected directly, and the 
electoral system does not encourage candidates to link to a political party or an electoral list. 
In the absence of any other systemic needs for nationwide party linkages, the form of 
government might play a particularly important role in electoral systems without partisan 
elements. Accordingly, I expect that party nationalisation is higher in PR elections and in 
parliamentary regimes.5 
Secondly, centralisation of government has been employed as an institutional explanation of 
party nationalisation (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Cox & Knoll, 2003). In heavily centralised 
states, national political issues matter more to voters, because at this level of government the 
most substantial policies are decided. Political actors have little interest to organise on a local 
or regional level if there are no political responsibilities at this level, so that “local parties are 
abandoned altogether and disappear” (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004, p. 222). Decentralisation 
opens space for regional political parties (Blais & Carty, 1991, p. 85). 
                                           
 5  Concerns about endogeneity problems – it might be the case that presidential regimes are established at the 
absence of strong national parties – can be ruled out, recognising that Geddes (1996, p. 29) demonstrated 
that strong presidencies "were established prior to, or at the same time as, freely elected legislatures". 
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While for the study of certain countries, the centralisation of government dimension explains 
the variance fairly well (cf. Chhibber & Kollman, 2004), namely if these countries elect by 
plurality vote (USA, Canada, India, and UK), there might be reservations about this expla-
nation and its causality in the Central and Eastern European case, for three reasons. First, the 
presented idea relies in large part on the indirect election of the prime minister, assuming 
single party majority governments and the existence of two main national parties, which 
compete against each other.6 Such cases are rare in Central and Eastern Europe, not at least 
due to the widespread application of proportional representation (PR) and mixed electoral 
systems. If parliamentary majorities for a single party are rare, small parties, even regional 
ones, can gain a lucrative role as kingmaker, and in change obtain particular benefits. 7 They 
might for instance press for increased regional autonomy. Hence, even in highly centralised 
states, there is no need for the voters to abandon small or regional parties. 
Second, even in a two-party competition, the two main competitors might as well be based on 
regional divides or interests (for instance in Ukraine, cf. Katchanovski (2006)). In such a 
case, party nationalisation will be low, even in a unitary state. To be precise, we might expect 
that countries with dominant regional cleavages might adopt a decentralised administration, 
so that the combination of strong centralisation and regional conflicts might be rare. 
Thirdly, the centralisation hypothesis presumes that the institutional structure of the state 
gives incentives for the (non-)formation of regional parties. However, the contrary might be 
the case too: Regionalist parties, when participating in governing coalitions, might demand a 
stronger political or financial decentralisation (Heller, 2002; Chhibber & Kollman, 2004, pp. 
                                           
 6  In a two-party system, where a single party holds a majority of parliamentary seats, small regional parties 
have hardly any coalition potential at the national level. Instead, the group’s interests might be better 
represented if it decides to align with the large parties, and thus be represented in governments. 
 7  Even in Westminster systems, governments often rely on the support of regional or ethnic parties. 
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226-227).8 Federalist institutions might "reduce the expression of regional protest in the party 
system by opening up institutional channels of voice" (Caramani, 2004, p. 292). They might 
be introduced reacting to the emergence of regionalist parties. Party nationalisation might be 
not only the consequence, but also the cause of state centralisation. 
The cleavage hypothesis 
Alternatively, party nationalisation might be explained as a consequence of the territorial 
structure of social or socio-economic divides (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Caramani (2004, p. 
15) addresses the centre-periphery and the urban-rural cleavage as “territorial” divides, 
connected to low levels of nationalisation. In contrast, “functional” cleavages, such as the 
economic cleavage in Western Europe, do not have a territorial character, so that parties 
organising along such cleavages are highly nationalised (cf. Caramani, 2004; Cox, 1999, p. 
159). 
The explanation of party system structures by cleavages has been criticised though, because 
cleavages do not convert into parties as a matter of course, but this is produced by the politi-
cal system itself (Zielinski, 2002, p. 187). Looking at Central and Eastern Europe, only a few 
scholars are looking for similarities of political divisions with social cleavages in Western 
democracies (Kitschelt et al., 1999). The view overwhelms that cleavages, especially if they 
are narrowly defined, are of limited relevance in the region (Elster et al., 1998, pp. 247-270). 
However, one social divide9 appears to be an exception to the rule: The ethnic divide10 is 
salient in Central and Eastern Europe (Evans & Need, 2002) and helps many parties to 
mobilise their voters (Elster et al., 1998, p. 252). Ethnic minorities exist in almost all 
                                           
 8  A typical case are the regional parties in the recent government in Spain (Agranoff, 2005; Hopkin, 2009). 
 9  I employ the term social divide rather than cleavage, acknowledging that these divides have different 
characteristics from the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
 10  Lipset and Rokkan (1967, p. 10) refer to it as the cultural or centre – periphery cleavage , while in the view 
of Kitschelt et al. (1999) it is part of a greater cultural cleavage. 
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countries, and they vote in large numbers for their own parties. Furthermore, issues related to 
ethnicity help as well nationalist parties of the titular nation to mobilise their voters. 
The investigation of ethnic divides in order to explain party nationalisation degrees may yield 
promising results, as many of the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern European countries 
are territorially settled. If such ethnic divides become manifest in party politics, then the 
ethnic structure of a country will explain why the electoral strength of political parties varies 
across regions. 
Ethnic and national identities have been discussed as constructed categories (cf. Evans & 
Whitefield, 2000), and the unification of the nation state and a homogeneous ethnic structure 
have been identified as a two-way process (Caramani, 2004, p. 23). Ethnic awareness of 
(parts of) the population can be engineered (through education, media, use of language, etc.) 
or forced through violence ("ethnic cleansing", genocide). A prime example from the most 
recent history of the region are the wars in former Yugoslavia.11 
However, in the post-1990 period, ethnic identities were substantially more stable than the 
party systems. Indeed, all current ethnic categories in Central and Eastern Europe have earlier 
roots, and even if ethnic perceptions might underlie a slow change, all ethnic group that can 
be identified today were already considered to be distinct ethnic groups before the recent 
transition.12 Accordingly, the ethnic structure is almost an exogenous variable in the region. 
                                           
 11  Exactly speaking, a causal loop of ethnic identity, party nationalisation, and the centralisation of the 
government might be theoretically the most appropriate expectation (Bochsler, 2006). 
 12  Problematic groups, because variably treated as ethno-regional minorities or part of the titular nation, are 
Moravians (Czech Republic) and Silesians (Czech Republic and Poland). Moravians oscillate between an 
ethnic and a regional group (Fowkes, 2002, p. 129). In Poland, there is a minority with a distinct regional 
identity in Opole-Silesia, but for economic reasons and higher prestige, they declare as ethnic Germans 
(Zarycki, 2002). In both cases, I rely on their self-declaration in the national censuses. In the countries of 
former Yugoslavia substantial parts of the population in some territories were forced to migrate or massacred 
on ethnic grounds in the wars of the 1990s, with Bosnia and Herzegovina as most affected case. The 
population declaring as ethnic Russian in the Baltic States declined in numbers (Campos & Kuzeyev, 2007, p. 
626), but this decline was arguably much less important for the party systems than the lower citizenship rate 
among ethnic minorities in Latvia and Estonia. 
11 
Still, being aware of the possibility of two-sided processes, particular attention is devoted to 
the ex-Yugoslav, and particularly to the Bosnian case in the empirical part of this article. 
Ethnic mobilisation is constant at a very high level across the region, so that the results of 
such analysis do not stem from different levels of mobilisation. There are different motives 
for ethnic mobilisation (see, for instance, Brubaker, 1996; Kymlicka, 2002, p. 20; Evans & 
Need, 2002, p. 656). However, mobilisation appears as a common constant for all countries 
under study, so that there should not be any problem of circular dependency. 
The intervening character of electoral systems 
Electoral systems might exert constraints against the formation of regional parties (Cox, 
1999, p. 159). My main focus relies on national legal thresholds, which exclude parties below 
a certain national vote share from representation in parliament (cf. Taagepera, 1998). The 
thresholds in Central and Eastern European democracies, reaching from 2.5% (Albania) up to 
6% (Moldova) of the national vote, seem rather moderate. However, what is not particularly 
high for a national political party throws regional competitors out of the electoral race. A 
party, which is only competitive in a region with 10% of the national voters would need to 
get half the votes in this region to pass a national threshold of 10%. Under substantial 
national legal thresholds, regional parties can thus only get access to parliament if their 
region is sufficiently large and if they have a fairly dominant position in their region, or 
alternatively, they can anticipate that they have no changes to get elected, and not even 
compete. 
Different from legal thresholds, small electoral districts  do not have a special effect on party 
nationalisation. Since electoral districts are territorially defined, such with a small number of 
seats exclude locally small parties, but they do not particularly affect regional parties. 
12 
Many of the minorities are rather small, so that legal thresholds might exclude minority 
parties from representation, and keep party nationalisation at high levels, even in countries 
with territorial ethnic divides.13  
The development of party nationalisation over time 
Lastly, time might play a role for party nationalisation, particularly in party systems in forma-
tion. In Western democracies, party nationalisation increased in line with the economic, 
social and cultural modernisation and integration of the society (Caramani, 2004). Unlike 
Western European countries during the time of enfranchisement, Central and Eastern 
European economies and societies were mainly modernised and nationally integrated, when 
the countries were democratised. The starting point for the development of party systems and 
party nationalisation is thus not comparable in Central and Eastern Europe and in Western 
Europe. An initial lack of organisational strength of political parties (Olson, 1998, p. 434) 
might imply that party nationalisation was lower in a first period than in later elections. High 
inter-election volatility, as experienced in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
might lead to the erosion of local party strongholds and to increasing party nationalisation. 
Cases and operationalisation 
Despite the importance of party nationalisation for the analysis of party systems, it has only 
recently been measured and explained for a broader number of countries. It is still little 
investigated for Central and Eastern Europe. The region is particularly interesting for the 
study of party nationalisation due to the importance of territorial conflicts, and given that 
many external factors are constant, it is suited for comparative analyses. All countries of the 
                                           
 13  Some half-hearted variants of national legal thresholds do not hinder any party from winning seats in 
parliament, but hinder small parties below the threshold from winning a few remainder seats or bonus seats 
at the national level (Slovenia in 1992/96 and Poland in 1991). Such weak thresholds do not inhibit small 
parties from winning district seats, and thus should not be an obstacle for the creation (and the success) of 
regional political parties. 
13 
region have experienced a communist legacy and started democratisation almost at the same 
time. On the other hand, the range of possible socio-economic cleavages is much smaller than 
in Western democracies, except for ethnic divides, what allows me to focus on ethnicity for 
my investigation. Ethnicity is easily measurable, because ethnic identities are very stable in 
the region. The investigation of young democracies is further interesting, since elections in 
early stages of democracy are crucial for the establishment of party systems and merit 
scholarly attention. 
Many previous investigations on party systems of post-communist countries have selected 
only the most stable post-communist democracies, or the ten new EU members, and studies 
on party nationalisation have remained limited to one or very few countries (Ishiyama, 2002; 
Meleshevich, 2006). This article provides for the first time a broad inventory of party 
nationalisation in Central and Eastern Europe, covering the period of 1990-2007 in twenty 
countries, and 95 elections all together.14 Only not (reasonably) competitive elections are 
excluded.15 An exclusion of the less stable democracies in the Western Balkans, as done in 
other analyses, would exclude the least nationalised cases. Given that the regional fractionali-
sation of the party systems in some ex-Yugoslav countries might be a factor that contributes 
to political instability, an exclusion of these cases might be an indirect way of selecting the 
cases on the dependent variable. The inclusion of all twenty post-communist democracies in 
Europe allows more reliable results of comparative analysis. 
Measuring party nationalisation requires electoral results at sub-national levels such as 
regions, districts, municipalities, or counting circles. I built a new database on electoral 
                                           
 14  Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo are included as separate cases after 1996, because there were no more 
common elections to the joint parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. De facto, since the late 
1990s, the highest relevant elected and representative bodies were the Serbian, the Montenegrin, and the 
Kosovo parliament. 
 15  Belarus, elections in the 1990s in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and later in Serbia, and the 2007 
elections in Russia are excluded. 
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results from Central and Eastern Europe at the regional and local level, including elections 
held in the period 1990-2007. Electoral results from ten countries for the period 1990-2001 
were available from the University of Essex.16 Further datasets were collected by the author. 
All in all, my database includes 66,623 sub-national units (such as districts, regions, munici-
palities, or polling stations) from 95 elections (Bochsler, 2010, forthcoming). 
The nationalisation of political parties and party systems has been studied with many 
different measures, and the quality of indicators has importantly improved with ongoing 
evolution. Nevertheless, many measures still have potential shortcomings that might lead to 
problematic outcomes when different parties or party systems shall be compared (see 
Caramani, 2004; Bochsler, 2009, for an overview). Many measures are insensitive to 
transfers of votes from one party to another, they weight large and small districts equally, 
even if this typically leads to an unequal treatment of urban and rural parties, or they are 
biased by the number of territorial units taken into account. Hence, they are not useful for the 
comparison of different countries with a different number of territorial units. Conclusions 
obtained on the basis of such measures risk to be artefacts of the employed measures. 
Therefore, for the operationalisation of my dependent variable, I employ the standardised 
party nationalisation score (Bochsler, 2009), which accounts for the mentioned problems. 
Based on the Gini coefficient of inequality, it measures the territorial heterogeneity of 
electoral support for political parties or party systems, considering differences in electoral 
support in territorial units, such as electoral districts, regions, or municipalities. The maximal 
value of one (high nationalisation) would be reached when the relative party support (vote 
                                           
 16  The Essex database provides regional electoral results for one up to four elections per country, altogether 
twenty-three datasets (elections) could be used for my purposes, partially supplemented with further data. 
  Election result database of the “Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe” 
at the Department of Government, University of Essex. The database is accessible at 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/. 
  In the case of some of the mixed electoral systems, the datasets needed to be completed with further data, 
because the Essex database provides sub-national results only for one of both tiers. 
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share) is perfectly equal across all units, whereas in cases where (almost) all the votes are 
concentrated on a small part of the territory, the score indicates the value zero. 
Among the explanatory variables in my model, political decentralisation might be measured 
either through constitutional strength of regional or local governments, or through budget 
decentralisation. I choose the second option, due to the better comparability,17 and because 
local or regional governments exist, but in many cases lack a real autonomy, due to 
insufficient transfer of government funds. While party nationalisation data is provided for the 
whole period 1990-2007, the available data on financial centralisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe allows only a cross-country analysis, but no systematic analysis of the development 
over time.18 In the few countries where longitudinal quantitative data is available, the level of 
financial centralisation varied only little over time.19 
When studying ethnic divides as a variable to explain the structure of a party system, it is 
relevant to identify all existing ethnic groups (to the extent possible), independently of the 
politicisation of their ethnic identity, in order to avoid that the case selection is biased by the 
existence of political parties which mobilise on ethnic divides. The most popular database on 
ethnic minorities (Gurr, 2005) has been criticised, because it looks primarily at minorities in 
conflict, and might be not appropriate for the purposes of the study of party nationalisation, 
                                           
 17  Partial data on the strength of local governments may be found in the World Bank Database on Political 
Institutions (Beck, 2001), but both databases are incomplete.  
 18  Accessible sources with longitudinal data neither provide it for all the relevant cases, nor for the whole range 
of time, covering usually just two elections per case for only a part of the countries. 
 19  The EU member states are covered by the World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators. Data based on the 
Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001, available at  
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm. The average for the last three 
years contained in the 1996-2000 period was calculated. Data for non-EU member states (found in Davey, 
2005; Marcou, 2005; for Ukraine: Yilmaz et al., 2003, p. 138) refers to the years 2000 or 2003. Where 
different sources contained data on the same country, they were usually congruent; in the cases of Croatia 
and Romania, data which appeared more solid and not out-of-date were used. 
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including only politicised ethnic conflicts.20 Other databases avoid this problem (Alesina et 
al., 2003; Campos & Kuzeyev, 2007), but do not contain data on the regional structure of the 
ethnic groups. In order to identify all relevant groups, I rely on different, complementary 
sources. I have cross-validated census data with the information from independent sources, 
such as the reports of human rights organisations. 
Expecting that only geographically concentrated ethnic minorities can have an impact on 
party nationalisation, I do not measure ethnic fractionalisation, but rather, to what extend the 
ethnic groups live concentrated.21 The indicator of territorial ethnic divisions (eC) is a mea-
sure of fractionalisation that counts all territorially concentrated minorities against a basis of 
groups consisting of the ethnic majority (or the largest ethnic group) and all non-concentrated 
minorities.22 If all groups are geographically concentrated, it is identical to the Hirschmann-
Herfindahl index.23 
The level of national legal thresholds is taken from my novel database (Bochsler, 2010, 
forthcoming). Likewise, I include average district magnitude m, included in my database, as a 
                                           
 20  In Central and Eastern Europe, certain larger groups are not included, such as the Moravian minority in the 
Czech Republic, which does not express any particular political demands. MAR codes certain ethnic groups 
jointly when they have common political interests (such as different Slavic groups in Moldova). 
 21  Cox and Knoll (2003) rely on ethnic fractionalisation, since “ethnic groups do often tend to segregate 
residentially”. 
 22  I calculate the probability that two randomly selected members of a society belong to different groups which 
are geographically separated by a territorial boundary. I consider a minority as geographically concentrated, 
if a majority of the group is in a small part of the territory, relying on census data, or if not available, on 
qualitative information. For a more precise operationalisation, more detailed data would be needed. 
  The indicator of territorial ethnic heterogeneity is calculated as follows: 
  ( ) 221 ∑∑ −−= CiNCiLC ggge  
  gL population share of the largest ethnic group 
  gNCi population share of the non-concentrated ethnic minority i (except for the largest ethnic group) 
  gCi population share of the territorially concentrated ethnic minority i (except for the largest ethnic group) 
  My operationalisation neglects if several concentrated minorities live in the same are, because such 
information is not systematically available. The resulting error, however, is of minor nature, since there are 
to my knowledge no cases where several larger minorities live in the same area. 
 23  gi population share of ethnic group i 
  ∑−= 21 igHH  
  The index is used among others by Fearon (2003) or Alesina et al. (2003). 
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control variable. District magnitude has been hold accountable for party nationalisation (Cox, 
1997). Finally, the impact of time is measured through the ordinal number of the election, in 
a raw of democratic elections by country. Particularly, in the initial elections, a part of the 
party system might be little institutionalised and nationalised, so that the highest change rate 
is expected in early stages of democratic consolidation. This is operationalised using the 
inverted ordinal number of the election (T = 1/number of election). 
Party nationalisation in Central and Eastern Europe 
The nationalisation of party systems varies substantially among the investigated countries. 
For some elections, nationalisation amounts to more than 0.9, which means that the vote 
distribution is almost perfectly homogenous across the country. In single-seat district 
elections in Russia and Ukraine, party nationalisation scores are considerably lower than any 
recent election in Western Europe or in America, often below 0.3. Both countries experienced 
an inflation of local, non-partisan candidates in single-seat districts (see below). Further, 
party nationalisation scores of Bosnia and Macedonia are extremely low (table 1).  
xxx include table 1 about here xxx 
 
In-depth election studies have employed aggregated data to illustrate territorially based 
patterns of party support in Central and Eastern Europe, and to track them back to socio-
economic characteristics of the regions and municipalities. One clear pattern emerging from 
the analysis of territorial data is that in several countries, the electoral geography is closely 
linked to the ethnic structure of the territory, notably in several Balkan countries (Bosnia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia), in the three Baltic states, and in Slovakia.24 Further, 
the urban-rural divide determines electoral behaviour in several post-communist democracies 
                                           
 24  See Bochsler (2008, pp. 67-70) for an overview. 
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(Elster et al., 1998, pp. 248-249; Johannsen, 2003). Peasant parties have temporarily been 
successful in rural areas of Poland and of Russia, but failed to establish a stable electorate.25 
Mostly, electoral results vary between cities and the countryside, even if not as strongly as 
along ethnic line. The urban-rural divide is however not as clear-cut and stable as the ethnic 
one, it varies less across countries, and it is partly the result of politically initiated economic 
reforms of the post-communist period, so that the variable is not exogenous to my model. 
Before moving to the cleavage explanation and the role of super-presidential systems, I first 
test the centralisation hypothesis, discuss reservations about the direction of the causality, and 
show why it does not help to explain party nationalisation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The centralisation approach and the direction of causality 
Lacking of time-series data for decentralisation, my analysis of the government centralisation 
hypothesis is limited to a cross-sectional comparison of twenty countries for the period 
around 2000. (Due to the limited number of observations, I rely on a bivariate analysis.) 
Figure 1 reports how party nationalisation is related to the centralisation of government 
expenses (PR elections considered). Most countries in the region are heavily centralised. 
There is a positive trend, in the sense of the hypothesis: decentralised countries more often 
have regional party systems, centralised countries nationalised ones. The correlation relies, 
however, solely on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with extreme decentralisation and 
very low party nationalisation. After the exclusion of Bosnia, the correlation vanishes.26 
xxx Include Figure 1 about here. xxx 
 
                                           
 25  Cf. Wegren and Konitzer (2006, p. 685); Szczerbiak (2001), and many others. 
 26  If Bosnia is included, the correlation coefficient amounts to 0.688 (99% significant). If Bosnia is excluded, 
the coefficient amounts to 0.03 (and the relationship is statistically significant only at 10% probability). 
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Bosnia is thus the possible key case for a relationship of weak party nationalisation and 
extreme decentralisation, and “central government institutions exist largely on paper” 
(International Crisis Group, 1999, p. 3). However, in this case, the causal sequence of the 
regional disintegration of the party system and decentralisation (if there is such an immediate 
link at all) goes the other way round (Bochsler, 2006): In a nutshell, in the initial 
democratising elections in 1990, when Bosnia was still centralised and a Republic of former 
Yugoslavia, a new party system emerged, consisting mainly of three ethnically oriented 
parties, representing the main ethnic communities. The ethnic separation of the political 
parties has not changed by today. However, in the five years to come, Bosnia experienced 
war, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, which was only stopped in the Dayton peace agreement 
that provided an extremely decentralised structure of the state. The historical sequence 
reveals that the ethnically-based and disintegrated party system of 1990, already split along 
the same ethnic lines as after the war, was putting the basis for the extreme decentralisation 
of 1995. 
It might be too early to assess whether low party nationalisation has similar consequences all 
across the region, although there are other countries with weak nationalised party systems 
that have recently discussed or even decided steps to decentralise the administration.27 
Following the ’Ohrid framework agreement‘ of 2001 in Macedonia, municipalities gained 
substantial autonomy. Municipal borders were re-drawn, in order to allow the self-govern-
ment of the Albanian-speaking minority, and to settle the ethnic conflict. Hence, in this case 
too, decentralisation was anticipated by the split of the party system into ethno-regional 
parties, more than a decade earlier. 
                                           
 27  All federal countries in the region dissolved after the collapse of communism. In these cases, the formation 
of new parties in the newly emerging states (at this time sub-national entities) preceded the dissolution or 
the separatism and the disappearing of the central government. 
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In brief, in Central and Eastern Europe, the correlation between government centralisation 
and party nationalisation relies on a single case, for which the often assumed causality that 
centralisation of the government leads to party nationalisation can be dismissed. More recent 
development in Macedonia reinforces the view that in Central and Eastern Europe, changes in 
decentralisation are anticipated by the emerging of regionally based parties. 
The ethnic divide and the electoral system model 
Instead of the decentralisation approach, I explain party nationalisation through social 
divides. Following a broad number of studies, I operationalise this approach relying on ethnic 
diversity (Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1994; Mozaffar et al., 2003, to name a few). I expect that 
stronger territorial ethnic divisions eC will be related to lower party system nationalisation n. 
n = α + β1 * eC + ε 
For countries without any concentrated ethnic groups (eC=0), party nationalisation might be 
high, but still not perfect. Other territorial divisions might impede party nationalisation from 
being perfect, and to some extent, random variation of district results contributes to imperfect 
nationalisation. The intercept α, estimating party nationalisation at the absence of any 
territorial ethnic divides, will thus be slightly lower than 1, while the slope β1 is expected to 
be negative. Since both eC and n are measured on a scale from 0 to 1, and assuming a linear 
relationship, the absolute value of the slope needs to be smaller than the intercept, |β1| < α. 
Otherwise, our model would predict that in countries with many territorial ethnic divides, 
party nationalisation is negative. The slope β1 depends on the strength of the translation of 
territorial ethnic divisions into the party system, and if parties are a mirror of the ethnic 
structure of the country, |β1| will be close to α. In Central and Eastern Europe, where ethnic 
divides are fairly important for party competition, |β1| will be reasonably close to α. High 
national legal thresholds might have a moderating impact on the translation of territorial 
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ethnic divisions into party nationalisation, while in the absence of national legal thresholds, 
territorial ethnic divisions have a non-moderated impact on party nationalisation.28 
The two super-presidential systems in the region, Russia and Ukraine, are identified through 
a dummy variable.29 In both cases, presidential and parliamentary elections were held non-
concurrent for the elections under study,30 and presidents were absent from party campaigns 
for legislative elections (Moser, 2001, p. 102). The presidential regime in Russia is 
considered to have subverted party formation (Hale, 2006, pp. 205-209). An interaction term 
pres*SSD identifies elections in super-presidential regimes and in single-seat districts. 
Further control variables are included for single-seat district elections (SSD), for elections in 
the single-seat district tier of mixed compensatory electoral systems (SSD*comp), and for the 
inverted ordinal number of elections (1/T). 
The model is tested in an OLS regression, with two specifications including only elections 
under PR, and overall 81 cases,31 and two further models extending the view on elections in 
single-seat districts, or mixed electoral systems, counting up to 103 cases (table 2). All four 
models reveal a substantial impact of concentrated ethnic groups, moderated by national legal 
thresholds. While in countries with no legal threshold or a moderate one, a clear negative 
relationship of territorial ethnic divisions and party nationalisation emerges, this changes 
                                           
 28  Differentiated thresholds, mostly applied for multi-party coalitions, are not considered. 
 29  Presidential power is measured through the expert survey by Fish (2006, p. 11). Systems with presidential 
power of 0.5 or above are coded as super-presidential. This criterion divides the cases in two clear groups. 
Fish’s measure, because it is based on the wording of the constitution and constitutional practice. Presiden-
tial superpower is sometimes given through practice, such as the use of veto power through the president. 
The classification corresponds widely with Clark and Wittrock (2005, p. 183). 
 30  In Russia, parties have negligible importance in presidential elections and in government formation 
(Oversloot & Verheul, 2006). Among the super-presidential systems, only in 1994 in Ukraine, parliamentary 
and presidential elections were held in the same year, but the parliament was elected three months ahead of 
the presidential elections, so that a major impact can be excluded. The second Russian president Vladimir 
Putin has attempted to get more links to the party system. However, Russian elections after 2003 were not 
included in this study. 
 31  In the case of mixed electoral systems, for the PR part of these systems. The Czechoslovak elections 1990 
and 1992 are excluded, because the legal threshold applies at the level of the sub-entities (Czech 
Republic/Slovakia), and it can thus not be operationalised in line with the other thresholds. 
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under high national legal thresholds – in the countries under study the highest threshold 
amounts to 6%. There, territorial ethnic divisions do not have any impact on party 
nationalisation. The effect is statistically significant in all four models. Models 1 and 3 
demonstrate that the magnitudes of the effects highly correspond with the expectations. The 
two models, which do not control for the degree of centralisation (which might be a 
consequence, rather than a cause of party nationalisation), report a very high level of party 
system nationalisation. In the absence of territorially based ethnic divides, slightly rising after 
increasing democratic experience, it amounts almost to 0.9. Where territorial ethnic divisions 
exist, party system nationalisation is much lower. In models 1 and 3, the absolute value of the 
coefficient β1 ≈ -0.7 is almost as high as the negative value of α, from which it follows that in 
Central and Eastern Europe, territorial ethnic divisions are strongly reflected in low party 
nationalisation.  
xxx Include table 2 about here. xxx 
In the third and the fourth model, I include all elections, both in PR and in single-seat 
districts. For double ballot elections under mixed electoral systems, both the PR and the 
single-seat tier are included separately, since both theoretically and empirically, substantial 
differences between both tiers might be expected and are observed (figure 2). (Alternatively, 
one might include only one type of electoral systems, such in models 1 and 2, or calculate an 
overall average score for mixed systems, which however would be little satisfactory, given 
the widely varying results for both tiers.) The most pronounced differences between both tiers 
can be observed in the mixed electoral systems of Russia and Ukraine (and to a lower extent 
in Lithuania) where national parties could hardly establish successful candidates in single-
23 
seat districts, and in many districts did even not compete (White et al., 1995, p. 199; Moser, 
2001; Birch, 1998, p. 98).32 
 
xxx include figure 2 about here xxx 
 
Super-presidential regimes, jointly with elections in single-seat districts, lead to much lower 
nationalisation of party systems. While both under PR and in (semi-)parliamentary regimes, 
there are institutional reasons for candidates and voters to align with national parties,33 no 
similar institutional incentives exist in single-seat districts, and in super-presidential systems 
(where presidential and parliamentary elections are not simultaneously). Neither does the 
logic of the electoral system encourage candidates to link over district borders, nor do the 
parliamentary elections have the character of nationwide elections of the prime minister, so 
that party nationalisation remains low. This mainly explains the peculiarities of single-seat 
district elections in Russia and in Ukraine. Other variables are not statistically significant at 
the conventional levels. 
Specifications 2 and 4 include the degree of centralisation of government spending (in 2000, 
or close to, see above) as an explanatory variable. Despite the inclusion of this variable – 
which is arguably not exogenous to the dependent variable – the main effects are still clearly 
statistically significant. 
                                           
 32  Similarly to local parties that compete in one constituency only, independent candidates can be accorded a 
very low degree of party nationalisation. Party nationalisation is understood as the establishment of national 
parties and party labels that dominate in national politics. There is no major difference between a local 
candidate which is supported by a personal electoral committee or cases where a local political group, 
declaring as political party, supports a candidate. Certain candidates who belong to a nationwide party run as 
independents in a district (Moser, 1999, p. 148), but lacking systematic data, we need to treat them as 
independents. 
 33  Drawing on the experience of post-Soviet countries, Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001) conclude that single-seat 
district elections in conjunction with superpresidentialism might damper party institutionalisation. Their study 
further suggests that the strength of the presidential office is rather positively correlated with party 
institutionalisation, but this is derived from a selection of countries all with very strong presidencies. 
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Besides the role of super-presidentialism, political legacies of the post-Soviet space, and 
socio-economic aspects have also been discussed to explain the low party institutionalisation 
in Russia and Ukraine.34 Hale (2006, pp. 4-5) lists ten competing ones for the Russian case. 
However, many of them have not been tested systematically in cross-country analyses. While 
most of these explanations are plausible for the explanation of the outcomes that are observed 
in Russia or Ukraine, they would similarly apply for other post-communist countries, or for 
all electoral systems, so that they can not explain why only the single-seat district part of the 
Russian and Ukrainian electoral system.35 
Conclusion: The determinants of party nationalisation 
This study has shown that party nationalisation in post-communist democracies is closely 
related to the territorial structure of social divides, except for cases where the electoral 
systems provide for a high degree of nationalisation, or where super-presidentialism hinders 
the creation of strong nationalised parties. While previous research has held that social 
cleavages play a lesser role in post-communist democracies (Elster et al., 1998; Sitter, 2002), 
this study emphasises the importance of ethnicity as a major and stable social category. The 
party systems and namely the territorial structure of the parties' electoral strength often reflect 
ethnic patterns. In order to investigate this relationship, this study proposes a new way to 
measure the territorially based ethnic fragmentation of countries. 
                                           
 34  Oversloot & Verheul (2006); Moser (1997, 1999, 2001); Birch (2000); Ishiyama & Kennedy (2001); Herron 
(2007); and many others. 
 35  A full overview of competing hypotheses and their empirical tests is included in Bochsler (2008). For 
instance, the weakness of national political parties in Russia is often explained as due to the short democratic 
experience and the authoritarian legacy (White et al., 1995, p. 199; Moser, 1999, pp. 147-148), but in other 
countries with an authoritarian legacy and a mixed electoral system (e.g. Albania), national political parties 
dominate the elections. Moser (1999, p. 162) has found that the introduction of party labels on the ballots in 
the single-seat district tier reinforced partisan candidates. Hence, party labels even in Russia seem to be 
beneficial. The literature mentions that the registration rules for parties and candidates have weakened party 
development both in Russia (Moser, 1995, p. 382) and in Ukraine (Birch, 1998, pp. 111-112). Pre-electoral 
rules might have contributed – in conjunction with other factors – to the costs to form other small and 
regional parties for the district tier, and discouraged party formation. However, the occurrence of dozens of 
parties, among them very small ones, on the electoral lists suggests that even small parties could pass the 
demanding registration procedure. 
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Apart from that, this study argues for the impact of national legal electoral thresholds on 
party nationalisation. High legal thresholds exclude regional parties from competition, hinder 
territorial divides from being manifested, and this way increase thus party nationalisation. 
In Russia and Ukraine, there are a couple of elections under a single-seat district system, 
where party nationalisation is much lower than in other comparable cases. Both countries 
applied (most of the time) mixed electoral systems, combining PR wit single-seat districts. 
However, party nationalisation was only low in the single-seat district part of the elections. 
Super-presidentialism is a plausible explanation for these results: in countries where the 
executive is not formed based on a parliamentary majority, but relies on the president, there 
are few reasons for candidates to join national parties, especially if there is no PR that pro-
vides important incentives for party formation. The bureaucratic costs of forming or joining a 
national party are quite high both in Russia and Ukraine. Given that these findings rely 
mainly on these two outliers, only a broader study including additional evidence from other 
cases might allow a more solid empirical examination. 
My study shows the impact of social divisions and of legal thresholds on party nationalisation 
in a quantitative analysis. With regards to the common decentralisation hypothesis, it comes 
to a pronouncedly different conclusion than the main argument of previous comparative 
research (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Cox & Knoll, 2003). The few cases in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which underwent a process of decentralisation, teach us that this was 
anticipated by low party nationalisation, and ethno-regional political parties pressured for a 
decentralisation of the state, so that the causal relationship appears to go in the opposite 
direction than commonly suggested. Rather than decentralisation, both the ethnic structure 
and national legal thresholds allow a very accurate explanation of the varying levels of party 
nationalisation in post-communist democracies. 
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Figures and Tables 
 PR* single-seat districts* 
country mean (S.E.) N mean (S.E.) N 
Albania 0.83 (0.06) 3 0.84 (0.04) 4 
Bosnia 0.45 (0.02) 5    
Bulgaria 0.86 (0.02) 6    
Croatia 0.80 (0.01) 3 0.77 (0.02) 3 
Czech Rep. 0.89 (0.03) 4    
Estonia 0.77 (0.06) 5    
Hungary 0.89 (0.04) 5 0.86 (0.07) 5 
Kosovo 0.73 (0.03) 3    
Latvia 0.75 (0.02) 5    
Lithuania 0.87 (0.02) 3 0.62 (0.05) 4 
Macedonia 0.69 (0.03) 2 0.63 (0.02) 2 
Moldova 0.82 (0.03) 4    
Montenegro 0.83 (0.03) 4    
Poland 0.84 (0.04) 5    
Romania 0.79 (0.04) 5    
Russia 0.87 (0.04) 4 0.27 (0.07) 3 
Serbia 0.88 (0.04) 3    
Slovakia 0.82 (0.01) 4    
Slovenia 0.88 (0.01) 5    
Ukraine 0.72 (0.04) 3 0.29 (0.08) 3 
Total 0.80 (0.11) 81 0.64 (0.24) 24 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of party system nationalisation in twenty countries, 1990-2007.  
* including PR resp. single-seat districts in mixed electoral systems 
The database and the sources can be accessed on www.bochsler.eu. 
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Figure 1: Budget centralisation and party nationalisation (PR tier), 1998-2001. 
O Bosnia and Herzegovina, X other countries  
For countries with several elections in the period, the closest elections to 2000 were taken. (Bosnia: 2000, 
Moldova: 2001) In the case of Macedonia and Ukraine, the 2002 elections were included, because no sub-
national data is available for the PR tier in the 1998 elections (in both countries under a mixed electoral system). 
17 cases with available data. 
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Figure 2: Party nationalisation in the PR tier and in the single-seat district tier in mixed electoral systems. The 
line shows the equality line, where party nationalisation is equal in both tiers. 
 
 
(1) only PR elections (2) only PR elections (3) all elections (4) all electionsRegression model 
Dependent variable: 
Party nationalisation 
B S.E. VIF B S.E. VIF B S.E. VIF B S.E. VIF
Constant .90 .03  .73 .11  .92 .03  .84 .05  
             
Territorial ethnic divisions (eC) -.69** .07 2.15 -.45** .16 6.90 -.71** .06 2.21 -.61** .08 6.04
National legal threshold (t) -.33 .54 2.99 .84 .71 4.27 -.29 .51 4.69 .22 .57 5.91
Interaction ethnic divisions/ 
threshold (eC * t) 
9.67** 2.71 2.78 3.31 3.22 5.70 9.39** 2.54 3.21 6.41* 2.86 5.28
Number of election (inverted) 
(1/T) 
-.04 .03 1.14 -.05(*) .03 1.15 -.07* .03 1.15 -.07* .03 1.19
Degree of centralisation (cen)    .16(*) .09 3.80    .07(*) .04 3.55
Single-seat district elections 
(SSD) 
      -.02 .02 2.67 -.02 .02 3.02
Single-seat district tier in 
compensatory systems 
(SSD*comp) 
      .02 .03 1.79 .04 .03 2.34
Superpresidential systems 
(pres) 
      -.05 .07 1.77 -.04 .07 2.12
Interaction superpresidential/ 
SSD (pres* SSD) 
      -.46** .06 2.27 -.45** .07 2.43
N 81 2.27 74 4.36 103 2.47 96 3.54
countries (clusters) 20 19 20 19
R2 0.768 0.822 0.895 0.910
Table 2: OLS regression to estimate party system nationalisation, robust standard errors, cases clustered by country.  
**significant at p < 0.01; *significant at p < 0.05; (*) significant at p < 0.1. 
 
 
